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The scenario
Harry was found near a smoking gun with his face severed
from his skull. He was still breathing, so paramedics
inserted an endotracheal tube and took him to the emer-
gency room, where he displayed strong vital signs and
ventilated well, with normal oxygen saturation. Surgical
evaluation revealed that he had succeeded in removing
everything from his chin to his ears and to his eyebrows,
and had exposed and damaged numerous cranial nerves.
In addition, no normal anatomical landmarks could be dis-
cerned. Debridement and a permanent tracheostomy were
performed, and the remaining skin folded over.
By way of past history; Harry never got much of a break in
his 46 years of life. Unsuccessful marriages, failed jobs,
and severe depression resulted in multiple psychiatrists
and multiple suicide attempts. On this occasion, emer-
gency teams were called to investigate a gunshot
reported by his neighbours.
As the anaesthesia wore off, recovery room staff were horri-
fied to see Harry raise his left hand and examine his facial
packing. An immediate neurological examination showed
that he used his left arm in a semi-purposeful manner, but
was otherwise unresponsive – he had deep tendon reflexes
all around, and did not withdraw from painful stimuli.
An electroencephalograph demonstrated ‘diffuse slowing’,
but no other acute abnormality. Auditory evoked stimuli
showed no hearing function, and coded commands on
Harry’s palms and chest did not result in a response in the
good arm. Occasionally, Harry raised his left arm briefly
into the void, but he was otherwise unresponsive.
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Harry’s suicide note read “I have decided that life is too
painful for me to continue trying. I want my family to know
that I have thought about this and I believe it is the only
way out. Please forgive me and go forth with your own
lives.” His only son was contacted, but he declined to
make any decision on his father’s behalf because they had
been estranged for some time.
On final assessment, Harry could not hear, talk, smell, see,
or move anything other than his left arm. Over a period of
days, Harry developed an aspiration pneumonia requiring
multiple antibiotics, constant suctioning, and pulmonary
toilet. He would require permanent tracheostomy, feeding
tube and skilled nursing home care should he survive.
The attending physicians feel Harry should have all life
support removed and be allowed to die because his
suicide note demonstrated clear evidence of his wishes
– a variation on a ‘living will’. The psychiatrist dis-
agrees, however, stating that “The desire to commit
suicide is necessarily pathological and treatable. In the
past, Harry has changed his mind and called para-
medics after ritual suicide attempts. He cannot have
been competent to make the decision to die. We
cannot give authority to it, and we cannot know his
current wishes. He must be maintained as if he had
changed his mind and decided to live. That he is now
disabled doesn’t enter into it – disabled people rou-
tinely choose life and treatment.”
Should Harry’s suicide note be interpreted as a living will?
What actually happened
David Crippen
What would a reasonable person think if they took steps
to effectively end their life, and then ‘woke up’ with no
sensory ability at all, except searing, diffuse pain in quiet
darkness? Of course, they would think they were in Hell.
Most living will laws allow patients to die of an untreatable
disease process if they have written evidence that they
would not want to be sustained with life-supporting tech-
nology [1]. Harry left a convincing living will. He stated
clearly and lucidly his desire to be relieved of his life, and
the only reason that he is more or less around for us to
worry about is because he bungled the suicide attempt.
Because Harry has no ability to care for or protect himself,
without continuous, intense and invasive medical care he
will surely go on to die. 
Thus, Harry’s disease process is eventually terminal, he is
in constant pain and he has a de facto living will that
clearly states his wishes [2]. He meets all of the criteria
that any ethics committee would readily agree to.
However, some physicians still think Harry might want to
take a chance on life again, with no ability to participate in
any of it.
Expert consultants say that we are obligated to artificially
prolong Harry’s suffering because he cannot tell us his
current wishes [3]. This assumption must be made
because Harry was impaired as a result of depression, a
potentially reversible disease. Impaired people cannot be
discriminated against, and so must be covered by substi-
tuted judgement. The possibility exists that Harry’s sober-
ing experience has jolted him to a realization that life may
be worth living after all, and we must give him the benefit
of that doubt. His seemingly authentic living will must not
be viewed as authoritative.
I find it interesting that these consultants have lost the
concept of what rational humans would do if faced with
unimaginable horrors. Has anyone in this group ever
observed a sane person to proffer a living will stating
their premorbid desire to be placed in a nursing home on
a ventilator, feeding tube and dialysis? Then maintain
that existence with frequent trips to emergency depart-
ments and ICUs to maintain vital signs and laboratory
values, and to repeat the cycle over and over, until they
finally die of some process that cannot be temporarily
reversed?
As a practical matter, I think Harry is in need of someone
to take charge of the situation, eschew vacuous ivory
tower academic diatribe and simply do the right thing [4].
Therefore, as Harry’s physician, and acting in what I feel
the clinical evidence suggests in his best interest, I have
gathered all the nurses and staff to Harry’s bedside to say
the following:
“You all know Harry here. Harry decided that he did
not want to participate in life anymore. He wrote
these wishes in a note that I believe is authentic
and authoritative. Harry then tried to end his life in a
very effective manner. No ‘call for help’ gestures.
Harry meant it. Unfortunately, Harry also botched it,
and now his situation is infinitely worse than when
he started on this course.
It has been suggested by consultants that Harry
might have changed his mind and desires us to
continue his suffering, and cannot tell us his
wishes. As a practical matter, I do not believe that
this is the case. If Harry’s psychic pain made him
miserable in life, he now has sensory deprivation
and physical pain/discomfort superimposed. It is
inconceivable to me that Harry would want to live in
this terrible world we have created for him.c
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Therefore, as Harry’s physician, I have decided that
what we’re going to do is take his ‘extraordinary’
artificial life support away and compress five million
years of natural selection into the next thirty
minutes. If Harry survives off the vent and all other
modalities except ‘ordinary care’ – nutrition,
hydration, a clear airway and comfort measures –
then we will give our consultants the benefit of the
doubt. Harry will get a percutaneous enteral gas-
trostomy feeding tube and transfer to a nursing
home. However, if Harry cannot survive with the
‘ordinary’ care that everyone deserves, then Harry
will die as was his premorbid wish.”
Requiem – the reverend asked me if I wanted to say a few
words at the graveside:
“I did not know Harry before I met him under the
most difficult of circumstances. I was placed in a
position of having to deal with a lot of things
about Harry that I don’t understand, like depres-
sion and suicide. I asked a number of my col-
leagues to help me best deal with Harry’s
dilemma and received a multiplicity of thoughtful
answers. These well-meaning consultants almost
uniformly followed society’s hard lines in dealing
with society’s anomalies. If a person assumes a
philosophically uncomfortable attitude, we must
always err on the side of assuming that they
would snap back into political correctness if
given another chance. I was Harry’s doctor. I felt
Harry’s pain and I ended it because, in the end,
the preponderance of evidence as to Harry’s
wishes pointed in a direction that seemed author-
itative and reasonable. The decision ultimately
came down to me and I made it. In my heart of
hearts I think it was the right thing to do. If it
wasn’t – God help me.”
We cannot acquiesce to emotional convenience
Donald B Chalfin and Cory Franklin
Advance directives, or living wills, are inherently complex,
and often ethically and emotionally challenging. Even
under the best of circumstances, in which an informed and
thoughtful individual who is fully cognizant of all options
and sequelae, drafts and executes a comprehensive docu-
ment and appraises others of his or her wishes, almost all
advance directives contain flaws and uncertainties. It is
nearly impossible for even the most informed and intro-
spective person to anticipate all events and possibilities. It
is even more elusive to address issues of certainty regard-
ing the wishes of unfortunate patients who failed to or
were unable to convey their decisions, and establish com-
petency, cognition and even consciousness to allow these
wishes to be executed.
This case depicts a complex scenario with many con-
founding and almost unfathomable variables and conse-
quences. From a clinical standpoint, one cannot argue
with the notion that this is a most unfortunate and gut-
wrenching situation; Harry’s failed suicide attempt led to
horrific clinical consequences of overwhelming and per-
manent disability, profound disfigurement, and complete
and utter dependency on others and society in general for
all aspects of his care. Instead of ending his life and allevi-
ating his ‘pain’ as detailed in his suicide note, an opposite
– almost unimaginable – course of action occurred. Even
in the best-case scenario, all that Harry’s clinicians can
hope for is a ‘stabilization’ of his status, with the eventual
placement of a tracheostomy and feeding tube with life-
long care and residence in a nursing home. Meaningful
cognition and basic human interaction will be lost forever.
From the perspective of clinical compassion, one can fully
sympathize with and admire the desires of the attending
physicians to alleviate the patient’s suffering and attempt to
honour his ‘wishes’. However, the suicide note cannot be
considered a living will, and thus life support should not be
removed at this point. From the standpoint of the individual
patient who has specified or desires to draft and stipulate
an advance directive, competency is essential. In the major-
ity of suicide cases, depression is a major component and
contributing factor, and therefore it has the real potential to
alter competency and comprehension of the vital issues.
This case is further confounded by the fact that the patient’s
injury led to the permanent inability to evaluate whether
depression was present when the act occurred, and, if
present, whether it influenced the patient’s underlying com-
petency and ability to comprehend the meaning of his acts
and wishes. In essence, the psychiatrist is correct in his
statement regarding the presence of pathology – depres-
sive or otherwise – and the current status of the patient pre-
vents one from ruling depression and related pathologies in
or out. Thus, one must assume, barring the presence of new
information, that the potential for depression did exist when
the patient attempted to take his life, and therefore that this
obviates the assumption that the suicide note might be con-
sidered, in whole or even in part, to be a living will.
In addition to the concerns that are specific for this and any
other individual, one must reckon with the fact that society
(or the state) may override patient autonomy and obviate
one’s wishes, even if those wishes were expressed by a
conscious and competent individual, should four potential
conditions exist that warrant contravention: (1) the preven-
tion of suicide; (2) protection of a third party; (3) mainte-
nance of the integrity of the medical profession; and (4) the
preservation of life. In this case, it can be argued that up to
three of these conditions exist (1, 3 and 4) and therefore
that, even with the tenuous assumption that competency
was present, discontinuation of life support must not ensue
under the present circumstances.
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/5/3/115Clearly, then, it is incumbent on the physicians and all care
givers to look further and delve deeper into the issues, in
order to have the required medical and ethical diligence to
establish prior wishes and directives. In the absence of
this action, and/or assuming that new information may
not exist or cannot be uncovered once all investigative
measures have been exhausted, the attending physicians
should continue to treat the patient and provide comfort
measures, in addition to therapeutic support and mainte-
nance of his vital functions dictated by medical necessity.
Although this case is emotionally searing and one that
tests the will and compassion of all involved, we need to
remain ever cognizant regarding the potential ramifications
of all of our interventions and actions, and their associated
nonactions and noninterventions (ie the proverbial ‘slip-
pery slope’), which may extend beyond this particular
case. In short, as much as we may cringe about the
ghastly state of affairs, we cannot acquiesce to our passiv-
ity or ‘emotional convenience’ and let patients die because
they may have unresolved issues – clinical, psychiatric, or
otherwise – that result from our failure to act on their
behalf in advance in their time of need, and to do our
utmost to expeditiously address these underlying needs
and unanswered questions. Only when we exhaust all of
the investigative options on Harry’s behalf to truly discern
his pre-existing desires, wishes and state of mind will we
be able to consider a different course of action.
Depression, like cancer, can be refractory to treatment
Jack K Kilcullen
The easy answer as to why a suicide note should not sub-
stitute for a living will is that any will, whether intended to
take effect before or after death, serves as an instrument
of human action, enforceable by the courts, when the
actor is not capable of being heard. Safeguards are there-
fore essential, and for that reason a document that is
intended to carry out a person’s desire to die should
possess the same evidence of freedom and capacity as a
document intended to dispose of bank accounts and furni-
ture. Special language, multiple signatures and witnesses
are not mere formalities; they provide evidence that must
serve as the legal equivalent of a person’s live declaration.
The more difficult question concerns Harry’s right to die.
The living will and the suicide note represent the light and
the dark side, respectively, of the profound cultural
ambivalence that exists in the USA between a belief in the
sanctity of life, and the right to live life as freely as the con-
straints of a civilized society would permit. On the one
hand, the USA is a deeply religious nation, certainly by
European standards, with much higher rates of religious
observance, in which politicians infuse their electoral
themes with overt professions of belief in God. On the
other hand, there is an abiding disdain for secular authority
in the USA, where even the national constitution is
couched in terms of limitations on government power. Life
as a gift from God is considered sacred, yet we give
people remarkable freedom to waste their lives. Debate
over abortion and the death penalty reflect this tension
between authority and freedom at its most extreme; many
believe that the right to life is sacred before birth, but can
readily be squandered when someone commits a capital
crime. Consequently, in the hospital setting, we obey a
sense that life is sacred and will not substitute our judge-
ment for God’s, even when it means leaving a person to
languish for years in a failing body, suffering the inadequa-
cies of our custodial care. Only individuals themselves can
choose to forego that care through some judicially recog-
nizable declaration, and allow their bodies to fail as they
believe God might have intended all along.
Like the living will, the suicide note states a desire to have
an end to life when only suffering and despair seem likely
to fill the months or years left. Americans treat this in a dif-
ferent manner historically, because however much we
believe an individual is free to sin against God, we con-
sider suicide itself a sin and will not be a party to any of its
implications. Moreover, modern psychiatry, with its ability
to manipulate the levels of key neurotransmitters, has
given suicidal ideation rooted in depression a patho-
physiological basis for treatment. However, the fact that
thousands escape the best tools that psychiatry pos-
sesses and take their own lives tells us that, for some,
depression is incurable. This was Harry’s situation at the
moment he pulled the trigger. For all his previous gestures,
hope had finally run out. Both his words and his deed give
compelling testimony to the pain Harry suffered, and to his
desire to finally bring it to an end.
So now we stand at the bedside of a terminally ill patient
who is without a living will, but has provided ample evidence
of his wishes. Even the Court of Appeals in the State of
New York would find ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of
Harry’s desire to terminate the medical support necessary
to maintain his life. We do not really need to distinguish
between the means of support, be they artificially derived
respiration (the ventilator), artificially derived immune resis-
tance (antibiotics) or artificially derived nutrition (tube feed-
ings). It is clear from the totality of the evidence, and not just
the suicide note, that Harry would have had none of it.
The question of Harry’s competency to make the decision
to die cannot simply be assumed away as the psychiatrists
would, as if the suffering of depression is somehow bear-
able, while that of chronic pain is not. Although it is a tenet
of psychiatry that ‘the desire to commit suicide is neces-
sarily pathological and treatable’, Harry’s depression, like
many cancers, was refractory to treatment. Moreover, any
living will expresses the broader belief of society that the
desire to die, rather than being a mental pathology, could
be the most courageous expression of sanity a person
Critical Care    Vol 5 No 3 Crippen et almay ever make. Through the living will, we allow people to
define the terms for withholding treatment by which we
will assist them in committing suicide as assuredly as if we
had handed them a gun.
So, let Harry die with all the best palliative care we can
offer. Our best compassion as healers comes when we
match the grace of our patients with our own humility.
Advance directives: expressed wishes or mandatory
guidelines?
Stephen Streat
The scenario as portrayed does not ring true in a cultural
sense in New Zealand, and I suspect in a number of other
countries with similar ex-British legal and medical tradi-
tions and institutions. I first discuss the relevant areas of
legal, medical and cultural difference, and then describe
what would probably happen in this country if such a
patient were to arrive at the emergency department.
The concept of the living will, or advance directive, is well
known to New Zealand intensivists, but the reality is that
these documents have had little impact thus far on clinical
practice.
First, we have read several advance directives that have
been given to us by the families of American tourists who
have become critically ill while visiting our country. My per-
sonal experience is notable in that, without exception,
these individuals have indicated either the wish to avoid
prolonged intensive care support of multiple organ failure
or have requested the withdrawal of intensive therapies in
the event of severe damage to the central nervous system.
Both of these practices are common, without living wills, in
New Zealand intensive care units.
Second, the concept is now explicitly described in New
Zealand legal documents. Section 11 of the New Zealand
Bill Of Rights Act of 1990 [5] states that “Everyone has
the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment.”
More recently, The Code of Health and Disability Ser-
vices Consumers’ Rights became law on 1 July 1996 as
a regulation under the Health and Disability Commis-
sioner Act of 1994 [6]. This code mandates that “Every
consumer may use an advance directive in accordance
with the common law.”
Third, in response to the enabling legislation and regulation,
the New Zealand Medical Association [7] has produced a
guide for patients on advance directives [8]. Included in this
is a discussion of the circumstance in which a ‘health care
provider’ doubts the validity or applicability of a ‘consumer’s’
advance directive. Crucial to this discussion are four points:
whether the consumer was competent to make the particu-
lar decision, when the decision was made; whether the con-
sumer made the decision free from undue influence;
whether the consumer was sufficiently informed to make the
decision; and whether the consumer intended his or her
directive or choice to apply to the present circumstances.
The guide goes on to suggest that “If the doctor believes
that complying with the advance directive would be contrary
to the consumer’s best interests, then the doctor needs to
consider consulting another person or authority that is
legally entitled to consent or refuse treatment on the con-
sumer’s behalf, for example, parents, legal guardians,
welfare guardians, and the courts.”
Fourth, there have not yet been any circumstances in which
such advance directives have been challenged through the
courts. It is currently unclear to what extent and under what
specific circumstances the documents might be binding on
intensivists looking after legally incompetent patients. In par-
ticular, our concerns as clinicians have centred around the
difficulty of trying to encapsulate, in a generic document, the
specific circumstances in which patients may find them-
selves in the future. It commonly seems, in our reading of
advance directives written in other countries, that they do
not fit the actual clinical circumstances with sufficient preci-
sion to enable an unambiguous interpretation of the writer’s
prior intent. This concern is often echoed by intensivists in
such countries, and has recently been discussed [9] by a
psychiatrist from Australia, a country that shares cultural and
legal traditions and has very similar intensive care practices
to those of New Zealand.
Finally, we have not yet encountered such a document in
our Department of Critical Care Medicine during the 4
years since the enabling regulation came into effect. I
believe that when and if such a document does appear,
we will treat it as a generic statement of previously
expressed wishes, but not necessarily as a mandatory and
binding document.
As a personal aside, it seems ironic to me that the appar-
ent motivation for the advance directives we have read has
been fear of prolonged suffering. How sad it is that we
should be viewed as potentially responsible for this suffer-
ing by practicing our profession in a way that is driven
either by technological imperatives or by a fear of litigation
should intensive therapies be withheld or withdrawn. What
place does our profession hold in society when such doc-
uments are required to ensure that we practice with com-
passion and common sense? If this is the near future of
intensive care medicine, then I and many other New
Zealand intensivists will be questioning our motivation to
practice our wonderful craft.
Turning now to the case in question, it seems clear to me
that the suicide note cannot be viewed as a living will
within the guidelines for such documents in New Zealand.
However, we would not feel the need to have a living will
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/5/3/115
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patient in whom these actions seemed the correct course
to take.
Our approach to this patient would probably have
included intubation, ventilation and immediate surgical
debridement. This would have been followed not by early
tracheostomy, but by an early, meticulous and serial seda-
tive-free clinical central nervous system assessment, sup-
plemented by neurophysiology and imaging studies.
Usually this would involve computed tomography and
somatosensory evoked potentials, and occasionally other
studies including electroencephalography, brain-stem
auditory evoked potentials, visual-evoked potentials and
magnetic resonance imaging. Should this assessment,
which may take a few days, confirm that severe brain
damage has occurred, then we would seek to withdraw
intensive therapies in the context of a formally docu-
mented consensus process, involving first the intensivists,
then any other involved clinicians, and finally the family.
This process, which is in accord with a recent European
viewpoint [10], has been well established in our depart-
ment for many years, and is robust and flexible. We have
previously illustrated the process with clinical examples
[11], and more recently reported on the apparently satis-
factory bereavement outcomes for the surviving next-of-kin
that occur in a department in which such a process is
common [12].
In practice, in the scenario as presented, it is likely that
such a process would have occurred before the onset of
nosocomial pneumonia, and that antibiotics would not
have been given when that complication occurred. A psy-
chiatrist would certainly not have been consulted and the
suicide note would not have been considered as possess-
ing the potentially legal legitimacy of a living will.
A suicide note is not a living will
Robert D Truog
Unfortunately, as the concept of a living will has increas-
ingly permeated both medical culture and lay society, its
meaning and purpose have been distorted. This case is an
excellent example of how inaccurate understandings and
muddled thinking can lead to unnecessary confusion.
A living will is one form of advance directive. A typical
living will is a document that describes certain clinical con-
ditions that may occur in a patient after they have lost the
ability to make decisions for themselves, such as
advanced Alzheimer’s disease, or dependence on
mechanical ventilation in an intensive care unit. The docu-
ment then allows the patient to indicate preferences for
the type of care that he or she would like to receive, if they
were ever faced with being in a similar condition. Of
course, in reality the situations are never identical to those
described in the hypothetical scenarios, and so acting in
accordance with a patient’s living will must always involve
some degree of interpretation.
This is where the other form of advance directive, a durable
power of attorney for health care, becomes so important. In
this document, the patient indicates the individual that they
would like to have make health care decisions on his or her
behalf, in the event that the patient should lose decision-
making capacity. Therefore, the durable power of attorney
for health care specifies exactly who has responsibility for
interpreting the living will. Ideally, then, the two types of
advance directive work together toward the goal of treating
patients in the way that they would want to be treated,
should they ever be in the position of not being able to
make decisions for themselves.
In the light of this, it should be obvious why it is inappropri-
ate to interpret a suicide note as a living will. First of all, a
living will can only be executed at a time when a patient is
rational and competent to make his or her own decisions.
Anyone holding a loaded gun to their face need not apply
for membership to this group.
This alone is sufficient to invalidate the linkage between a
suicide note and a living will. There are additional prob-
lems, however. If we take the suicide note seriously as a
guide to how this patient should be treated, then the
patient’s clinical condition should be irrelevant. Imagine,
for example, that the patient blew off his leg instead of his
face, and was bleeding to death. Suppose he never lost
consciousness, and upon arrival in the emergency depart-
ment refused treatment, waving his suicide note in the air
and telling everyone that he wanted to die. I would be sur-
prised if many clinicians would agree to withhold treat-
ment under these circumstances.
The real question we need to answer here is simply “What
is the best thing for Harry under the present circum-
stances?” Hasty judgements, such as “We should let him
die because he wanted to commit suicide,” or “We must
keep him alive because he is now disabled, and most dis-
abled people want to live” only serve to trivialize the com-
plexity of the question. We need to take everything into
account: the horrible reality of his current condition, and the
psychological and social realities of his life – severe depres-
sion, a profound sense of failure and an estranged family.
Even standard legal and bioethical jargon such as ‘substi-
tuted judgement’ and ‘best interests’ are too simplistic to
answer the question. Substituted judgement tries to
answer the question in terms of what Harry would want for
himself, if he were able to decide. The fact that Harry is
suicidal, however, makes the situation more complicated.
Just as we would not allow an otherwise healthy individual
Critical Care    Vol 5 No 3 Crippen et alto leap from a tall building if we could stop them, so we
should not let Harry die just because he is suicidal. The
‘best interests’ standard is inadequate also, however,
because it assumes that we can make a judgement about
what is best for Harry in the absence of considering the
totality of what it means to be Harry, including the fact that
he is in a deep state of despair.
I do not know the correct answer to this case, but I do
know that it cannot be solved by equating a suicide note
with a living will, or by assuming that all disabled people
want to live. From the description given, I think my initial
judgement would be to adopt a palliative approach toward
Harry’s treatment, with the goal of making him comfortable
and with the expectation that he would not survive.
However, this is a choice that could only be made by
those at his bedside.
Defining 'extraordinary' care is key
Leslie M Whetstine
Equating a suicide note with a living will is ethically dan-
gerous, and is likely to lead the public into unhealthy per-
ceptions as to the role of physicians in society. By any
current ethical standard, it is best to keep suicide notes
distinct. That is not to say, however, that Harry’s note
should be disregarded and that he should necessarily be
maintained in this hopeless state of existence.
I will argue that, even though a living will is not present, life
support systems may be considered extraordinary care
and hence ethically forgone. Therefore, Harry may be
allowed to die a civilized death.
Whether or not we believe in rational suicide, or if
anyone agrees with Harry’s actions, we need to address
the current reality. Arguing over Harry’s competency, and
attempting to determine whether his decision was
‘autonomous’ makes little practical sense at this point in
the progression of events. The damage has been done,
and we are charged with bringing about the most
humane outcome possible. The consultants who believe
Harry was depressed and irrational may well be right, but
is this still an issue? Do we make him live because he
wanted to die? Not only is that counterintuitive, it is bar-
baric and ethically indefensible at this point in time. We
are not in a position to judge Harry or his motivations,
but to promulgate the best possible decision from a
series of bad ones.
In the absence of a surrogate decision-maker, and
without any knowledge of what Harry would have
wanted, it is generally considered appropriate to utilize a
‘best interests’ standard, a paternalistic approach that
tries to determine what a reasonable person would want
in this particular situation. However, in Harry’s case we
have a detailed past history. We know that he was trou-
bled, that he attempted to end his own life on numerous
occasions, and that psychiatric interventions always
failed. In this regard, one may wonder whether we can
use the ‘substituted judgement’ standard. That is, act
according to how we know Harry himself would have
acted; in short, let him die specifically because he
wanted to die. This is contrary to the expert consultant
above, and ethically speaking we need to examine it
more closely.
Working from what a reasonable person would want, it
seems that Harry’s current existence would be unaccept-
able. However, quality of life is a dangerous thing to judge,
because different people may have different opinions on
what is acceptable. Therefore, it may be more meaningful
to draw from Harry’s past. We know that he was dissatis-
fied, and, incompetent or not, those feelings of dissatisfac-
tion were authentic for him. For instance, no matter how
irrational it may be that I fear spiders, it stands that if I truly
fear them, then for me that fear is my reality, and no
amount of rationalization may ameliorate that fear. The
same holds true for Harry and his desire to die, for even
though his death wish might have been irrational, he could
not be helped by psychiatry, and to him it was his reality
that he would be happier dead than alive. Whether or not
we recognize the pathology is irrelevant at this point. Thus,
to compel treatment now, when he was miserable before
this predicament, is unconscionable.
Furthermore, when we assess the treatment modalities
required to maintain Harry, we need to consider all of the
effects that they produce. What are the holistic benefits of
the ventilator? I would argue that the burden of being sus-
pended in this existence via the ventilator far surpasses
any benefit to Harry. He cannot interact, and he cannot
recover; thus, to impose life support on him to extend this
suffering is misguided.
I also take issue with Dr Crippen’s ‘Darwinian Tolerance
Test’, which would involve removing what he describes as
‘extraordinary’ support and letting nature take its course. I
have two different objections to this proposal.
First, Dr Crippen conflates the terms ‘ordinary’ and ‘extra-
ordinary’ treatment. Working from Catholic medical ethics,
ordinary versus extraordinary treatment is a moral distinc-
tion, not a medical one [13]. That is, a treatment is no
more extraordinary than any other because it happens to
be high tech. A course of antibiotics can be regarded as
extraordinary treatment, whereas a ventilator may be
regarded as ordinary; it simply depends on the person and
the situation. In this tradition, morally extraordinary treat-
ment may be forgone, but morally ordinary treatment may
not, as we have a responsibility to respect life, but not to
prolong it at all costs [14].
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ordinary, a variety of factors that are pertinent to the indi-
vidual must be considered. For instance, what are the
burdens and benefits of the treatment? What is the
degree of discomfort the procedure may cause? What is
the emotional consequence of the treatment, and what is
the cost? However, Dr Crippen erroneously concludes
that, because nutrition is relatively easy to give, it should
be considered ordinary, and therefore compulsory. Such is
not uniformly the case, as nutrition and hydration can be
regarded as medical treatments, and forgone just as any
other medical treatments.
We have to ask why Dr Crippen will withdraw a vent
and let Harry die, but insists on introducing a feeding
tube that will artificially prolong his life. This is simply a
substitution of one intervention for another; the result of
maintaining either modality defeats the purpose of
relieving Harry’s suffering. The provision of nutrition and
hydration is not palliative, because it is maintaining
Harry’s existence, which we agree is too painful to be
endured. Furthermore, the notion that percutaneous
enteral gastric tubes are palliative by nature has been
disputed, as they can cause oedema, aspiration and a
host of infections. To withdraw a vent but start enteral
feeding is inconsistent.
My second concern regarding Dr Crippen’s analysis is his
readiness to relinquish Harry to those consultants he
appears to argue against originally. Should Harry survive
extubation, Dr Crippen maintains “we will give the consul-
tants the benefit of the doubt”, and thereby transfer Harry
to a nursing facility. This dubious statement negates his
prior position that “I think Harry is in need of someone to
… do the right thing.” What is the right thing? To see
whether he can breathe on his own and, if he does, to
hand his care over to those who want to maintain him
indefinitely? It does not matter who is given the benefit of
the doubt, so long as the patient’s interests are served;
therefore, what the consultants want should be of little
concern, if their wishes are contrary to what we perceive
is the right decision here.
In conclusion, although I agree with Dr Crippen’s desire to
do the right thing, his argument falls short because what
he says he wants to do is not what he ends up doing. If we
use an argument of best interests standard, coupled with
considering Harry’s past life experiences, whether or not
we agree with them, we can get a sense of what will be
the best course of action for him. In addition, invoking the
beneficence principle of doing well for patients and with-
holding treatments that impose more burdens than bene-
fits, it is ethical in this case to withdraw life support. Life
support in this case will also include artificial nutrition and
hydration, as these are not palliative measures, but cause
a prolongation of suffering.
Conclusion
David F Kelly
Despite the bizarre nature of the case, it and the com-
ments of the discussants raise important substantive and
procedural issues. The main substantive question is what
ought be done. As is usual, the procedural question is
who ought to do it and how. Both have ethical and legal
implications. In the case itself, the attending physicians
want (probably) to do the right thing for the wrong reason,
and the psychiatrist would do the wrong thing for both
right and wrong reasons.
The value of the suicide note
The attending physicians, and David Crippen, want to con-
sider the suicide note an advance treatment directive. This
is legally perilous and ethically wrongheaded, as other dis-
cussants have pointed out. Robert Truog’s alternative
case (in which the injury is less severe) is compelling.
Competent patients have the legal right to refuse treat-
ment, and there is some serious disagreement among
scholars about how to determine competency and about
how much competency is needed to make definitive deci-
sions in varying circumstances. However, few would
accept as definitive even the contemporaneous refusal by
a suicidal patient of treatment that would, more or less
quickly and easily, restore him or her to health. To do so is
to misunderstand autonomy and what it requires. Suicidal
tendencies are properly seen as reducing decision-making
capacity. In this the psychiatrist is correct.
However, it is true, as Leslie Whetstine points out, that the
note ought not be automatically disregarded. There is no
legal requirement that I am aware of to ignore written
requests that persons have made simply because the doc-
uments lack certain formal characteristics (signatures, wit-
nessing, special language) required by state laws. As Jack
Kilcullen notes, these characteristics do serve to provide
supporting evidence of the writer’s intentions, but many
state laws on advance directives are, either explicitly or
implicitly, ‘cumulative legislation’. They do not restrict
rights people had before they were passed. Thus, people
can still write down or talk about their wishes in other less
formal ways, and this evidence should be considered.
The discussants disagree about the evidence, if any, that
the note provides. Crippen states that it should be seen as
a  de facto living will. Kilcullen agrees with most of the
round-table that it cannot be that, but wants nonetheless
to give it serious weight. He appears to think that with-
holding treatment is the same as assisted suicide: “… we
will assist them in committing suicide as assuredly as if we
had handed them a gun.” Thus, a suicide note is more or
less the same as a living will, because it expresses a
desire to die. There is no time here to go into the thorny
problem of whether there is, in the end, a difference
Critical Care    Vol 5 No 3 Crippen et albetween killing and allowing to die. I am convinced that
there is such a difference, although I do not hold that the
difference is in every case ethically determinative. It must
be enough here to say that the US Supreme Court deci-
sions on physician-assisted suicide upheld that difference
as legally significant. It also seems apparent to me that
people who write advance treatment directives do not
thereby express a desire to die, as Kilcullen implies. What
they say, in effect, is “don’t do stupid stuff to me!” That is
very different. Thus, it seems to me that the suicide note
cannot be accepted as testimony of Harry’s rational
wishes about life.
However, it does tell us something. It tells us that in
Harry’s depressed state he wanted to die. At the least,
then, it tells us that we have no evidence that, in his
present horribly reduced circumstances, he would have
wanted to live. Although we do not know what he might
have thought about life when freed from his presumed
depression, we know that we do not know that he would
have wanted aggressive medical treatment in his present
condition. This is not much, but it is something. It means
that there is no evidence to support a substituted judge-
ment decision favouring continued life-sustaining treat-
ment. It is here, I think, that Donald Chalfin and Cory
Franklin err. Having correctly concluded that the note
cannot in any sense be considered a living will, they
seem then to argue that Harry must therefore be kept
alive. (I say ‘seem’ because it is not entirely clear to me
that they want this to be Harry’s permanent state. Their
last sentence speaks of ‘investigative options’ and sug-
gests that, after these are exhausted, a ‘different course’
might be possible. My problem with this is that they have
earlier concluded that Harry’s condition is such that
“Meaningful cognition and basic human interaction will
be lost forever.” If this is the case, what would the inves-
tigative options tell us? I return to these areas in the next
section.) This, I think, is the wrong conclusion to draw.
The lack of a living will does not mean that Harry would
want aggressive treatment in permanently terrible cir-
cumstances. It simply means there is not enough evi-
dence to know what he would have wanted. Also, the
four reasons that Chalfin and Franklin give for society to
override patient autonomy are apt indeed in the preven-
tion of suicide and in other circumstances as well.
However, in the present case the American ethical and
legal consensus is that the state’s interest in preserving
life is outweighed by Harry’s condition. There comes a
time when it is no longer morally or legally mandatory to
preserve life.
Also, in most jurisdictions this time can come even in the
absence of clarity about the patient’s wishes. If Harry is
unfortunate enough to live in a state where clear and con-
vincing evidence is required of his wishes before treat-
ment can be withdrawn, then we do not have such
evidence, but in all other jurisdictions our lack of evidence
to the contrary at least allows us to assume that we may
consider withdrawal.
The substantive issue – what to do?
Harry’s attending physicians are (probably) substantively
right. As all of the discussants except Chalfin and
Franklin – and, in one respect, Crippen – agree, Harry
should be given palliative care and allowed to die. I do
not think that the cause of his present condition is of
much relevance in reaching this conclusion. It may
indeed distract us. Depending on our attitudes about
suicide, we might be tempted to do more or less to keep
him alive than we would for a similar patient shot in a
robbery. This, after all, is the key to the case. We have a
patient before us with a (probably) terribly bleak progno-
sis. The physicians can keep him alive, but he will (prob-
ably) never again speak, eat, or interact in any
meaningful way with his environment. In short, Harry is
(probably) permanently unable to carry on the basic pur-
poses of human life. The treatment that he is getting is,
as Whetstine correctly points out, ethically optional. I
think it stands on the ‘stupid’ end of the ‘optional’ spec-
trum. We should stop doing it.
Whetstine is exactly right in her analysis of what ‘ordinary’
and ‘extraordinary’ mean in this context. Her response to
Crippen’s suggestion that “if Harry survives off the vent”
he would give him a permanent feeding tube is quite
correct. In Harry’s condition the determining factor is not
the complexity or the cost of the treatment modality. The
fact is that Harry will (probably) not benefit from any of it.
So turn it off (except, obviously, pain management), and do
not start anything new: no feeding tube, no antibiotics – ‘no
extraordinary means’.
However, there is the ‘probably’. Only Stephen Streat
seems to have worried that the case at it stands may not
present a clear prognosis. He wants to wait a few days
and then, if the assessment confirms permanent brain
damage, withdraw life-sustaining therapies. This appears
to me the proper answer to the substantive question.
The procedural question – who does it and how?
The case says little about Harry’s friends or family. What
about parents, ex-wives, siblings? Try to find them. This
may, of course, cause delay. Harry would be legally enti-
tled to insist on treatment if he were able to do that. His
family might make that very decision. American case law
tends to permit surrogates to insist on life-sustaining treat-
ment, even when physicians or ‘reasonable people’ would
not want it. Continued treatment for Harry is not medically
futile; it keeps him alive. Thus, it may be that Harry’s family
will not let the treatment stop, but American law still wants
a surrogate decision-maker for Harry, and the doctors
have to try to find some family to do this.
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them are willing) to act in this capacity, then hospitals differ
about whether it is necessary to go to court to get a
guardian appointed. That is the traditional way to do it, but a
number of hospitals have inaugurated policies in the very
rare case in which there is no surrogate of allowing the deci-
sion to forgo treatment to be made at the bedside after a
rigorous clinical (again, see Streat’s comments) and ethical
investigation. This is sensible. The court is not the place to
make decisions like this, and court-appointed guardians are
not necessary. There is also a problem of cost and one of
conflict of interest if one of the hospital staff is appointed. In
cases like these, the decision can properly be made without
these added difficulties and delays.
I end by underlining an important point made in the discus-
sion that is often overlooked. Advance treatment directives
are seldom if ever sufficient in themselves. As Truog
states, they almost always require interpretation. That is
why proxy directives are so often of greater help in
ambiguous situations. Someone has to do the interpreting,
and American law assumes the best someone would
know what the patient wants and would act in the
patient’s best interests. Even though these standards
(substituted judgement and best interests, or subjective
and objective standards) are imperfect, they are the best
we have. We might like to eliminate uncertainty, but
complex cases are uncertain. We do the best we can. In
Harry’s case we make sure of the prognosis and then
(assuming the agreement of any legitimate surrogate) we
stop doing stupid stuff to him.
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